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1 Introduction 
SecureCore is a research project funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) to 
investigate the fundamental architectural features required for trustworthy operation of 
mobile computing devices such as smart cards, embedded controllers and hand-held 
computers. The goal is to provide secure processing and communication features for 
resource-constrained platforms, without compromise of performance, size, cost or energy 
consumption. In this environment, the security must also be built-in, transparent and 
flexible.  
 
The significance of this research lies in the exploration of new approaches for threat and 
requirements analysis, a fresh look at integrated support for security, performance, 
functionality and usability in mobile platforms, and the potential for innovative 
advancements in processor instruction set architecture, operating system kernel design, 
and secure network protocols.  The SecureCore architecture is described in a set of 
documents; this document is a member of that set. 
 
As a guide for the SecureCore research, a concept-of-operations (CONOPS) has been 
developed that focuses on the use of handheld computing devices by emergency-response 
personnel.  It is generally understood that many emergencies could be handled more 
effectively if vital information (e.g., schematics of a large burning building) could be 
communicated in a timely and secure manner to the responders [1].  Emergencies in the 
context of the SecureCore CONOPS are assumed to be major disasters that involve vast 
resources from various government and non-government organizations, with one 
organization acting as a coordinating central authority (e.g., the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)).  The central authority would establish memoranda of understanding 
(MOUs) with other agencies in advance of an emergency.  The MOU would be a two-
way agreement: on one hand it would establish the ability for the central authority to 
request information from its partner agencies during an emergency, and on the other hand 
it would establish minimum security requirements imposed by the third party for the 
handling of the data when it is provided to the central authority.  
 
Functional requirements for a SecureCore handheld include the ability to support both a 
“normal context” and a “trusted context”.  A rough definition of a normal context is the 
ability to interact with the handheld in a way that is similar to any commercial handheld 
or Personal Digital Assistant (PDA).  A rough definition of a trusted context is the ability 
to use the same handheld in a high assurance fashion that can be relied upon to handle 




Figure 1. Normal and Trusted Contexts 
To provide the normal and trusted contexts a Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) 
will support a partitioning of handheld resources (e.g., disk space and memory), such that 
guest operating systems (OSs) can be multitasked without allowing covert information 
flows between them.  To keep the kernel small and simple, the SecureCore Security 
Services (SCSS) layer provides other handheld-wide security services.  Both the LPSK 
and the SCSS are trustworthy components, and are referred to collectively as the Trusted 
Management Layer (TML).  These can both be seen in Figure 2, where white areas are 
shown as trustworthy components, and where the vertical separations above the kernel 
represent partitioned resources. 
 
Figure 2 also shows a trusted component supported by the SCSS known as the 
SecureCore operating system (SCOS), with the trusted path application (TPA) as one of 
its applications. The SCOS provides minimal high-level operating system-like services to 
the applications that run on top of it.  The TPA is an application that provides a trusted 
user interface between the user and the other trusted components of the handheld.  
 
It is expected that the SecureCore handheld will store data with varying levels of 
classification (e.g., UNCLASS and SECRET), and support users with varying levels of 
clearance, which would classify it as a multilevel-secure (MLS) handheld.  Therefore, the 
trustworthiness of the trusted components will need to be very high.  This high level of 
trust will be accomplished by following recognized security design principles [2] and 
recognized security evaluation standards, such as the Common Criteria [3]. 
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Figure 2. Software Architecture 
Table 1 lists the assignment of functions and policies to the various components of the 
Secure handheld.  
 4 
 
Layer  Functions and Policies 
TPA Trusted Path interface to security-critical services 
SCOS Application Management 
Identification and Authentication 
Operating System Services 




Trusted Channel Management 
Inter-Partition Routing 




Cross-Partition and Inter-Process Communication 
Table 1. Function and Policy Assignment 
 
The SecureCore handheld will support both confidentiality and integrity policies.  
Subjects and objects will be associated with security labels that identify their combined 
confidentiality and integrity session levels or classifications.  When referring to such 
labels this document will use the A:B syntax, where A is the confidentiality component 
of the label and B is the integrity component of the label.  An example of such a label is 
UNCLASS:LOW.  Each component will include a hierarchical level and optional non-
hierarchical compartments. 
 
As mentioned above, this project is meant to produce a proof-of-concept for a computing 
platform that is suitable for use “in the field”, and is envisioned to be a small form-factor 
device, and is hereafter referred to as the SecureCore handheld.  Besides the features and 
security goals of the SecureCore handheld that have already been described, the 
following non-security factors were considered to determine the scope and functionality 
of the initial device: 
1. Cost of materials 
2. Time to design and implement 
3. Military and non-Department of Defense (DoD) government and first responder 
needs 
4. Usability 
5. Efficient use of resources, such as power usage 
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2 Glossary 
This section provides definitions of generally accepted security terms that are 
independent of this project, and which are referenced in this document.  They are listed in 
order of dependency. 
 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) 
“The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system, including 
hardware, firmware, and software, the combination of which is responsible for 
enforcing a security policy.” [4] 
Trusted Path 
“A mechanism by which a person at a [computer] can communicate directly with 
the Trusted Computing Base.  This mechanism can only be activated by the 
person or the Trusted Computing Base and cannot be imitated by untrusted 
software”. [4] 
Secure Attention Key (SAK) 
A secure attention key is a special hardware mechanism for invoking the Trusted 
Path.  For example, it can be a reserved key sequence on a keyboard to be invoked 
by a user to signal the Trusted Computing Base that communication between 
them needs to occur. 
Security Perimeter 
“The boundary where security controls are in effect to protect assets.” [4] 
Subject 
“An active entity, generally in the form of a person, process, or device that causes 
information to flow among objects or changes the system state.” [4] 
3 Definitions 
To minimize confusion while reading this report, the following definitions are provided.  
The definitions are loosely ordered by dependency, such that the later definitions are 
dependent on the earlier definitions.  The word “platform” is used to refer to a 
SecureCore handeld instead of “device” to avoid confusion when referring to components 
of the handheld, such as the network card or keyboard. 
 6 
3.1 Power States 
Platform Initialization 
Platform initialization relates to a “hard” boot of a SecureCore handheld.  
Initialization on a desktop computer happens on a fairly regular basis (e.g., daily), 
whereas initialization on a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) rarely happens (e.g., 
during the first power-up of the device, and when the system hangs and is reset).  
The initialization of a SecureCore handheld includes the initialization of all 
trusted components of the system (i.e, the LPSK, followed by the SCSS, followed 
by all SCOS instantiations, followed by the TPA) and may include the initiation 
of the boot sequence for guest operating systems that may exist in active 
partitions outside of the security perimeter. 
Platform Shutdown 
A SecureCore handheld is considered shut down when all subjects have been 
halted and the system powered off, such that additional processing requires a 
platform initialization.  Platform shutdown consumes the least power of any other 
state. 
Platform Standby 
Standby is a state where a SecureCore handheld is put into a low-power-usage 
mode (e.g., hard disks stop spinning, I/O is terminated), but the system is still 
available for nearly instantaneous access.  Desktops and laptops may use this 
mode, but PDAs depend on it.   
Platform Hibernation 
Hibernation is when the state of the SecureCore handheld is saved to hard disk 
prior to a platform shutdown.  When the platform is turned on, the saved state is 
restored from hard disk, rather than ending at the normal initial state after 
platform initialization.  
 
Figure 3 shows a power state diagram and how the above definitions relate to each other. 
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Figure 3. Power State Diagram 
3.2 Miscellaneous Definitions 
Trusted Management Layer (TML) 
The Trusted Management Layer is a term that refers to the LPSK and the SCSS 
collectively. 
Trusted Communication Channel 
A trusted communication channel is a TCB-to-TCB communication path that 
provides confidentiality and integrity for the traffic carried between them, and 
where the subjects involved in the communication have authenticated each other. 
Remote Trusted Path 
A remote trusted path is a mechanism to establish communication with the TCB 
of a remote system.   The remote trusted path is invoked by a person interacting 
with a local TCB.  The local TCB, in turn, establishes a trusted communication 
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channel with the remote TCB to support the remote trusted path.  As with a local 
trusted path, a remote trusted path “cannot be imitated by untrusted software” [4]. 
Remote Secure Attention Key (Remote SAK) 
A remote SAK is the first step in a network-based protocol that is used to 
establish a remote trusted path. 
Emergency Signal 
An emergency signal is a network-based communication from a recognized 
central authority (over a trusted communication channel) that an emergency 
situation has been declared.  
Emergency Security Level 
The emergency security level is the security level associated with a declared 
emergency. 
3.3 Partition-Related Definitions 
Partition With(out) Focus 
A partition has focus if it has access to the keyboard and screen, such that the user 
may interact with it.  All other partitions are referred to as partitions without 
focus.  Only one partition can have focus at a given time. 
Current Executing Partition 
The current executing partition is the partition assigned the current CPU time 
slice.  The current executing partition can be a partition without focus. 
Active and Passive Partitions 
An active partition is a partition that the LPSK schedules for the potential 
execution of subjects that may have been instantiated.  If a partition is not 
scheduled by the LPSK, i.e., it is intended to only hold data, then the partition is 
known as a passive partition. 
Normal Partition 
A normal partition is an active partition that contains low-assurance subjects 
outside of the TML, e.g., a commodity operating system (OS) or specialized 
application.   
Trusted Partition 
A trusted partition is an active partition that contains high assurance subjects 
outside of the TML. 
Emergency Partition 
The emergency partition is a partition that is configured at a security level that 
was pre-determined by a central authority (and third party data providers) for the 
proper handling of sensitive data during a declared emergency situation.  Such 
partitions are available for focus only during such emergencies, as described in 
Section 5.  A user is not limited to the emergency partition(s) during an 
emergency; rather, an emergency situation makes these additional partition(s) 
available for focus change. 
TPA Partition 
The TPA partition is the trusted partition that contains the TPA.  There can only 
be one TPA partition per SecureCore handheld. 
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Default Partition 
The default partition is the partition that is configured to be the partition with 
focus after platform initialization has been completed.  If the default partition is 
not explicitly defined in the installed configuration data (e.g., the SCSS 
configuration data), then the default partition is the TPA partition.  Partitions 
configured to be the default partition must be either the TPA partition, or a 
partition with a security level of UNCLASS:LOW. 
Guest Operating System 
A guest operating system (OS) is any OS that is running on top of the TML, 
whether in a normal partition or a trusted partition. 
Partition Halt 
A partition halt refers to the stopping of all non-TML subjects within a given 
partition.  From the point of view of the non-TML subjects it is equivalent to a 
sudden loss of power. 
Partition Boot 
A partition boot refers to the starting of the initialization of a non-TML subject 
for a given partition.  From the point of view of the non-TML subject (e.g., a 
guest OS) it is equivalent to turning on the power to the “computer” it is installed 
on. 
3.4 Authentication-Related Definitions 
TPA Login 
TPA login refers to logging into the TPA via a trusted path.  A successful TPA 
login provides additional menu options from the TPA that require Identification 
and Authentication (I&A) before being used, such as switching focus to partitions 
that are classified above UNCLASS:LOW. 
TPA Logout 
TPA logout occurs when the logout option is selected from a TPA menu.  TPA 
logout limits the TPA menu options to those that do not require I&A. 
Platform Lock 
Platform lock is a state that excludes all user I/O until the SAK is invoked and the 
user enters the correct password via the TPA.  A platform lock can only occur if a 
user has performed a TPA Login.  The state is entered either explicitly via the 
TPA menu or by a configured length of inactivity.  If the state was entered via a 
menu choice, entering the correct password unlocks the platform and displays the 
proper TPA menu.  If the state was entered via inactivity, then entering the 
password returns the focus to the partition that was in focus prior to the platform 
lock.  
3.5 Context-Related Definitions 
Normal Context 
Normal context refers to a user interaction with a SecureCore handheld normal 
partition. 
Trusted Context 




Transient trust refers to temporarily trusting a user with data objects that are 
urgently needed.  For example, under non-emergency circumstances the user 
would not have privilege or clearance to view the objects, but an emergency 
situation may allow the user to view them only during the declared emergency.  In 
this example, a system supporting transient trust would need to revoke access to 
the objects shared under such conditions when the emergency situation is over. 
4 Phased Implementation 
There are currently four phases planned for the design and implementation of a 
SecureCore handheld.  These phases are described below.  
4.1 Phase 0 
This is a rapid prototype without a lot of engineering put into interfaces and layering, and 
with a lot of the planned functionality missing.  It will be built on existing Intel x86 
hardware without the use of hardware-assisted virtualization features that may be 
available.  The entire TML will be in PL0, the SCOS will be in PL1, and a demo 
application will be in PL1 or PL3, as shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Phase 0 Architecture 
No guest operating systems will be supported. However, a supervisor will be developed 
to provide services to applications in low-integrity partitions.   The supervisor will 
provide a subset of operating system services, such as a library for easily providing user 
I/O with the screen and keyboard.  Applications will run in their own partition using 
either an SCOS interface, the supervisor, or directly using the SCSS interface. 
 
The only devices virtualized and shared between partitions are the keyboard and screen.  
No networking will be supported.  Only a crude TPA will be provided, if any. 
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4.2 Phase I 
The requirements listed in this document relate to Phase I. 
 
Drafts of the high-level specifications for all the planned SecureCore functionality will be 
completed, influenced by the experience of working on Phase 0.  The specifications will 
assume the availability of only four x86 privilege levels, and will be allocated as follows: 
LPSK in PL0, SCSS in PL1, SCOS in PL2, and the TPA in PL3, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Phase I Architecture 
The SCSS will provide a virtualized network card that can be accessed by all partitions. 
The emergency partition with its transient trust capabilities will be supported by an 
emergency application on top of a supervisor (or an instantiation of the SCOS). The TPA 
will be able to activate applications within its partition via the SCOS interface. 
 
The prototype will be modified to provide the specified functionality, but it may not 
comply with the specification. 
4.3 Phase II 
Phase II will produce a rapid prototype of the SecureCore architecture using hardware-
assisted virtualization features of an x86-based CPU.  The PL architecture of the 
demonstration software will change so that the LPSK is in PL-2, the SCSS is in PL-1, the 




Figure 6. Phase II Architecture 
A guest OS will be able to run in PL0 of low-integrity partitions.  The supported guest 
OS will be selected at a later date.  In other words, there will be only one particular OS 
that will be supported in this environment.  Applications activated by the TPA will be run 
in a different PL than the TPA.  The advanced power states described in Section 3.1 will 
also be available. 
4.4 Phase III 
Drafts of the high-level specifications for the features prototyped in Phase II will be 
completed, with the additional goal of specifying a TML that can qualify as a Type I 
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). 
4.5 Phase Summary 
A summary of the four phases is shown in Table 2.   
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Prototype   X X X  
Deliverables 
Specifications  X  X 
Transient Trust  X X X 
Virtualized network card  X X X 
Advanced Power States   X X 
Six PLs   X X 
Guest OS   X X 
Handheld form factor    X 
Functionality 
Type I VMM    X 
Table 2. Phase Summary 
5 Phase I Usage 
It is assumed that the Phase III SecureCore handheld will present a user experience that is 
more similar to that of a PC, such as the new Ultra Mobile PC (UMPC) devices, as 
opposed to that of a traditional Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), such as a Palm.  In the 
traditional PDA experience, the device is initialized once (or rarely, in the event of a 
system crash), and then put into device standby by either pressing the power button or 
after a defined period with no user input (referred hereafter as user inactivity). 
 
An example user interaction with a SecureCore handheld is given below, starting with the 
platform in a shutdown state: 
1. The TML is initialized after the user presses the power button. 
2. The SCSS attempts to boot all active partitions. 
This is a reasonable approach, but may seem at first glance like a waste of 
resources by booting a guest OS that may not be needed by the user.  However, it 
must be remembered that resources are allocated to each partition during platform 
initialization, including memory and CPU time, so waiting to boot an OS until 
requested by the user is a waste of the user’s time. 
3. The platform configuration dictates which partition has focus immediately 
following platform initialization.   
The TML will not allow a non-TPA partition to have initial focus unless the 
partition is labeled as UNCLASS:LOW. If the initial partition with focus contains 
a booted guest operating system, then the user can interact with it without 
intervention by the TPA.   
If the initial partition with focus is the TPA partition, the user must still invoke the 
Secure Attention Key (SAK) to gain access to a TPA menu.  This requirement to 
invoke the SAK before issuing TPA commands is necessary to provide an un-
spoofable trusted path. 
4. After the SAK is invoked, the TPA partition is given focus, and the user is 
presented with a limited menu by the TPA (e.g., logging into the TPA).  This 
initial limited menu is hereafter referred to as the unauthenticated menu. (See 
Table 3). 
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Note that changing the partition with focus does not prevent the non-TML 
subjects in the partition that lost focus from continuing to execute; the partition 
that loses focus simply loses user I/O visibility, though the non-TML subjects are 
oblivious to that loss.  Remember that the LPSK gives each active partition a 
fixed time slice for the execution of its subjects.  The state of the subjects in each 
partition is therefore saved at the end of each execution slice, and restored just 
before each execution slice.  Therefore, partition focus and partition scheduling 
are orthogonal. 
5. From the TPA unauthenticated menu the user may choose to change the partition 
with focus to an active partition that is labeled as UNCLASS:LOW.  Selecting a 
partition changes focus to the selected partition. 
6. If the user needs to perform a trusted command or change focus to an active 
partition that requires TPA login (i.e., the partition label dominates 
UNCLASS:LOW), the SAK is invoked, which changes focus to the TPA partition 
and presents the TPA unauthenticated menu. 
7. The user selects the “TPA Login” option from the TPA unauthenticated menu.   
Selecting the login option prompts the user to enter a username and password (or 
some other authentication mechanism).  The user is always associated with a 
session level at any given moment, as managed by the SCOS.  Before the user 
logs into the TPA the session level is considered UNCLASS:LOW.  After a user 
logs in, the same session level will be associated with the user unless an optional 
default session level has been configured for the user, or until the user sets a 
different session level via the TPA interface.   
8. After successfully entering the password and session level, an expanded TPA 
menu is presented to the user that is suitable for the current session level.  This 
expanded menu is hereafter referred to as the authenticated menu. (See Table 3). 
For example, if the current session level is TS:LOW, then the user can (among 
other things) change the partition with focus to any active partition that is labeled 
as TS:LOW.  One restriction is that the emergency partition is not available in a 
non-emergency situation. 
9. When the handheld receives a remote signal declaring an emergency situation (at 
an emergency security level), then the TPA partition becomes the focus (if it was 
not already).  At this point the user is in one of two states: a) the user has not 
logged into the TPA yet; or b) the user has already logged into the TPA.  
Depending on the state, the following will occur: 
Situation a): The emergency situation is communicated to the user, and the user is 
prompted to invoke the SAK (to ensure the user is not being 
spoofed) and log into the TPA.  The user is prompted to 
acknowledge receipt of the information.  After the acknowledgment 
the emergency partition becomes available for focus change. 
Situation b): The  emergency situation is communicated to the user, and the user 
is prompted to acknowledge receipt of the information.  After the 
acknowledgment, the emergency partition becomes available for 
focus change. 
The TPA (or another trusted component) is trusted to communicate the identity of 
the authenticated user to the remote authority. 
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10. The emergency partition contains an emergency application. 
The application allows files to be read that may be provided during an emergency. 
11. When the trusted communication channels have been established between the 
emergency partition and emergency data providers, the remote authority and third 
party data providers can have confidence that the sensitive data transferred to the 
handheld (and stored in the emergency partition) will not be available after the 
emergency is over.  The protocol for establishing the trusted channel, such as key 
exchanges, will be covered in a separate document. 
12. All communications between the remote authority, third party data providers and 
the handheld’s emergency partition take place at the emergency security level.  
All data received by the emergency partition is stored in the emergency partition 
and implicitly labeled at the emergency security level.  If changes to documents 
are made local to the handheld, and those changes need to be available after the 
emergency, then they must be transferred back to the provider before the end of 
the emergency. The details of this protocol will be the focus of future work. 
13. When a user changes focus to the TPA while the handheld is in an emergency 
situation, a different set of TPA menu options will be presented to the user, 
hereafter referred to as the emergency menu.  (See Table 3). 
14. When a signal is given from a central authority that the emergency is over, the 
TPA partition becomes the partition with focus, and the emergency partition is 
made inaccessible to the user and halted.  Invoking the SAK at this point presents 
the authenticated menu.  Exiting an emergency situation requires all the data in 
the emergency partition to be securely expunged to meet the transient trust 
requirement.  In addition, the emergency partition is restored to a clean state so it 
will be ready for the next emergency. 
6 TPA Requirements 
This section describes TPA requirements for Phase I of the SecureCore handheld.  In 
addition, a summary of the required TPA menus is provided, followed by a state diagram 
for the TPA. 
6.1 TPA User Interaction 
1. The TPA shall display prompts and other output to the user. 
2. The TPA shall accept user input. 
3. The TPA shall require a Secure Attention Key (SAK) be invoked before any TPA 
menu options are displayed.  
4. If a user is not yet logged in to the TPA, the TPA shall provide limited menu 
options after the SAK is invoked, known as the TPA unauthenticated menu. (See 
Table 3). 
5. The TPA unauthenticated menu shall provide an option for logging into the TPA. 
6. The TPA shall prompt for user ID and authentication data (e.g., a password) to 
facilitate the login request. 
7. After a user has logged in and established a session level, the TPA shall provide 
an expanded menu that is relevant to the current session level, known as the TPA 
authenticated menu.  (See Table 3). 
 16 
8. After a user is authenticated, TPA menus shall provide an option for setting the 
session level. 
This option allows the user to perform actions that are only possible at a particular 
level, such as changing focus to a different partition at a particular level. The 
possible session level settings are restricted by the user’s clearance. 
9. All TPA menus shall provide an option for displaying the current session level so 
the user is not required to remember the default session level or the last session 
level that was manually selected. 
10. The TPA authenticated menu shall provide an option for changing the current 
user’s password. 
This option is not available during an emergency because there is a high risk for 
users to forget passwords after they are changed, so it was determined to be a 
dangerous option during an emergency situation.  
11. All TPA menus shall provide an option to interact with other active partitions 
which, when selected, results in a change to the partition with focus. 
One of the basic capabilities of the TPA is the ability to change the partition with 
focus, so focus changing is a potential option for all TPA states. The TPA menus 
shall only display those active partitions that have a security level that is 
dominated by the current session level. A user shall only be able to change the 
partition with focus to partitions that are equal to the current session level. 
12. The TPA authenticated menu shall provide an option for setting the default 
session level for the current user. 
This is a usability feature.  It allows a user to explicitly set the session level to be 
used after a successful TPA authentication.  If set, the default session level is used 
instead of the implicit default security level of UNCLASS:LOW. 
13. After a user is authenticated, TPA menus shall provide an option for entering the 
User Master Key (UMK). 
If future research determines that the UMK is required during emergency 
operations, then the “Load User Master Key (UMK)” option shall be removed 
from the emergency menu, and the TPA shall require the entry of the UMK 
during transition to the emergency menu. 
14. After a user is authenticated, TPA menus shall provide an option for logging out 
of the TPA. 
Selecting the TPA logout option reduces the TPA menu options to the 
unauthenticated menu.  Logging out of the TPA shall not affect other active 
partitions in any way. 
15. All TPA menus shall provide an option to halt a partition. 
The halt option provides the user with the ability to reboot a problem partition 
(e.g., a hung partition).  The user shall only be able to perform a partition halt for 
active partitions that exist at the current session level.  
16. All TPA menus shall provide an option to boot a partition. 
The boot option gives the user the ability to boot partitions the user needs to 
interact with, but which are not currently booted.  The user shall only be able to 
boot active partitions that exist at the current session level. 
17. All TPA menus shall provide an option for performing a platform shutdown. 
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The shutdown option will allow the user to turn off the handheld (e.g., to conserve 
power), and should be allowed at any TPA state, even if the user is not currently 
logged in. 
18. The TPA shall not maintain the state of the current session. 
The TPA shall depend on the SCOS to maintain the following state information: 
1) the user’s current session level, 2) the login status (whether the user is logged 
in or out), and 3) the emergency status. 
6.2 TPA Emergency Handling 
1. Upon notification of a declared emergency, the TPA shall notify the user of the 
emergency and prompt the user to invoke the SAK. 
2. After the invocation of the SAK (described above), the TPA shall ensure the user 
is authenticated, shall inform the user of the nature of the emergency (as provided 
by the remote authority), and shall present an appropriate menu, known as the 
emergency menu.  (See Table 3). 
3. The emergency menu shall provide an option to redisplay the emergency 
description. 
4. The emergency menu shall provide an option for changing focus to the emergency 
partition(s). 
6.3 TPA Application Support 
1. The TPA shall be able to start an application that is installed in the TPA partition. 
The start of an application is the result of a TPA menu selection from either the 
TPA authenticated menu or TPA emergency menu, or as a result of an event.   
2. The TPA shall execute applications at the user’s current session level. 
3. The TPA shall provide a menu option to resume a suspended application. 
4. The TPA shall provide a menu option to terminate a suspended application. 
6.4 TPA Interactive Menu 
Table 3 shows the minimal TPA menu for Phase I, as culled from the TPA requirements.  
There are three different menus, depending on whether the user has logged into the TPA, 




Unauthenticated Menu Authenticated Menu Emergency Menu 
TPA Login TPA Logout TPA Logout 
Change Focus Change Focus Change Focus 
Platform Shutdown Platform Shutdown Platform Shutdown 
Halt Partition Halt Partition Halt Partition 
Boot Partition Boot Partition Boot Partition 
 Load User Master Key (UMK) Load User Master Key (UMK) 
 Start Application Start Application 
 Resume Application Resume Application 
 Terminate Application Terminate Application 
 Set Session Level Set Session Level 
Display Session Level Display Session Level Display Session Level 
 Set Default Session Level Set Default Session Level 
 Change Password  
  Display emergency description 
Table 3. TPA Menus 
6.5 TPA State Diagram 
Figure 7 shows the state diagram for Phase I of the TPA, as culled from the requirements.   
 
 
Figure 7. TPA State Diagram 
7 Additional Research 
Additional research is needed in many areas.  The following are topics that will be 
researched by CISR: 
1. The need for an administrative interface for making local and/or remote 
configuration changes to fielded handhelds must be studied. One contingency to 
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be included in the research and decision making is the possibility of a user 
forgetting the password in the field during an emergency. 
2. The necessity and scope of a trusted audit mechanism needs to be determined.  
The inclusion of an audit mechanism may change some design decisions, such as 
which trusted component performs I&A. 
3. With respect to “key management” the requirements currently only make 
reference to the User Master Key (UMK).  Research is required to determine 
whether additional key management functionality is needed or desired.  
 
Research is also needed on the following topics, but are not of specific interest to CISR: 
1. Research is needed on various power-saving modes, such as Standby and 
Hibernate.  Specifically, the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) 
needs to be better understood with respect to SecureCore. 
2. Usability issues for first responders should be researched.  Is it possible for a 
fireman to use a handheld device if he must be wearing thick gloves?  Can a SAK 
be a unique key sequence if only one hand is available for user interaction?  Is a 
stylus too awkward and prone to loss or drops to be useful in an emergency?  
What is a good user interface for first responders? 
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